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Eyes wide shut: persistent conflict and liberal peace building in Nepal and Sri
Lanka
Madurika Rasaratnam (LSE) 1 and Mara Malagodi (SOAS) 2 The decisive, albeit different, endings of armed conflict in Sri Lanka and Nepal and subsequent post-war developments challenge key assumptions about conflict that have informed post-Cold War international efforts to produce peace in such conflict zones. International intervention -including in Sri Lanka and Nepal -characterises armed conflict as sustained by specific political economies that can only be stably resolved by establishing liberal democracy and market economics. This paper examines liberal peace engagement in Sri Lanka and Nepal to challenge a crucial assumption of the persistent conflict thesis, namely the separation between political contestation and armed conflict. It argues that the divergent post-conflict outcomes of continuing ethnic polarisation in Sri Lanka and constitutional reform in Nepal reveal strong continuities in the dynamics of pre-war, war and post-war politics. This continuity challenges the presumed separation of politics and violence that drove international engagement to produce liberal peace and suggests that such engagement, far from encouraging reform, may have (inadvertently) sustained conflict in both cases.
The decisive, albeit very different, endings of the Sri Lankan and Nepali armed conflicts and the subsequent, equally divergent, post conflict developments in the two states pose an important challenge to the understandings of conflict that have informed two decades of international efforts to produce sustainable peace in conflict zones across the world. PostCold War efforts to resolve intra-state conflicts have been driven by a specific characterisation of conflict dynamics. In the policy prescriptions and aid policies of a range of powerful states, multilateral and non-state actors, organised violence is understood to be sustained by its own political economy, whereby armed non-state actors in particular are held to have an interest in perpetuating conflict and thwarting the possibility of peace. According to this conceptualisation, while violent conflict is said to be driven by the possibility of predatory economic activity, its lasting resolution is held to require institutional strengthening and restructuring to produce a state capable of effective (i.e. liberal, market and democratic) governance. Furthermore, there is also a clear policy consensus that in the absence of such reform, conflict will be persistent or recurrent. This framing of conflict, in which organised violence and political contestation are treated as inherently distinct, if intermittently linked, phenomenon, has informed post-Cold War peace building efforts across the world, including in Nepal and Sri Lanka.
The political dynamics of the Nepali and Sri Lankan armed conflicts and their clear linkages to pre-conflict and post-conflict dynamics pose important challenges to this understanding of violent conflict. This is not primarily, or even most importantly, because in both cases armed conflict appears, for the time being at least, to have ended. Instead, it is the pre-war and postwar dynamics of Sri Lanka and Nepal that pose a more important analytical challenge to the persistent conflict thesis. That is, while the conflicts ended very differently -in Sri Lanka through a decisive government military victory and in Nepal through a peace agreement followed by a constitutional process -both endings and subsequent events have strong continuities with political objectives sought by conflict protagonists before, during and after armed conflict. In this sense in Nepal and Sri Lanka conflict persists after war's end, not through violence alone, but through politics. That is, the many motivations, interests and specific political economies that were apparent in sustaining the Nepali and Sri Lankan civil wars did not exhaust the ontology of conflict per se, and the political objectives pursued through the war -as well as the pre-war and subsequently post-war periods -remain crucial.
In Sri Lanka the ending of the three decades old civil war ) between government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has paved the way, despite international pressure, for an accelerated and illiberal project of state-led Sinhala Buddhist majoritarianism -and concomitant Tamil resistance framed in nationalist terms. 3 Crucially, these dynamics are not only wholly continuous with the island's post-independence, pre-war, history, but were also evident in the rhetoric and strategies of protagonists during the war itself. Similarly, in Nepal the outcomes of the ongoing post-war constitutional process ('the solution' in liberal peace terms) are directly linked not only to the political agenda the Nepali
Maoists set out well before their armed insurgency began in 1996, but also the basis of rhetoric and strategies during the period of insurgency (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) . This article argues that these starkly divergent outcomes to armed conflict were shaped in determinate, albeit unintentional ways, by international interventions that adopted a framing of the organised violence of the Sri Lankan and Nepali armed conflicts as quite apart from the dynamics of normal political contestation.
International engagement in the Nepali and Sri Lankan conflicts was part of the expanding pattern of international intervention in numerous conflict sites in the past two decades. The notion of internal conflict as persistent and recurrent has been linked to -the now taken for granted as inter-related -issues of security and development. Persistent conflict is, thus, seen to generate multiple threats -such as refugee flows, terrorism and arms proliferation -to local, regional and global security, whilst also hindering the development processes that alone could inoculate conflict ridden states against repeated bouts of violence, and thus ensure future stability and security. The protracted and multifaceted processes of international engagement in the Sri Lankan and Nepali conflicts were driven by this dominant post-Cold here that international interventions, conceived and executed through the liberal peace framing of conflict, were crucial in determining the starkly divergent outcomes for liberal peace in both Nepal (an as yet incomplete 'success') and Sri Lanka (a self-evident 'failure').
Liberal peace interventions were premised on the belief that armed conflict, driven by specific political economies, not only represents a threat to state integrity, and therefore global security, but can also only be ameliorated by a restoration of legitimate state authority.
In research that quickly became hugely influential from the 1990's, Paul Collier and others argued that armed conflict was driven primarily by the feasibility or opportunity for loot, plunder and criminal forms of economic accumulation. 7 Furthermore, the ensuing illegal 'war economy' was then seen to provide the motivation and finance for the perpetuation of conflict. In other words, it is 'greed' or 'feasibility' and 'opportunity', not political 'grievance' that ultimately matters for conflict persistence. Armed conflict and its non state protagonists are to be treated, therefore, primarily as threats to the possibility of peace that must first be contained for peace to be made possible.
In short, while liberal peace conceptions draw a sharp distinction between the order of politics and the disorder of armed conflict, the Sri Lankan and Nepali case-studies reveal how political and armed conflict are intimately related. 10 Indeed, the close continuities between the pre-war, war and post-war eras in both countries, traced below, suggest that these armed conflicts were -in Clausewitzian terms -the continuation of politics by other means, 11 and the politics of the post-war period is, as Foucault has argued, the continuance of war by other means.
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Liberal peace, persistent conflict, armed non state actors and the war on terror 'An implication of the feasibility hypothesis is that if the incidence of civil war is to be reduced, which seems appropriate given its appalling consequences, it will need to be more difficult. This is orthogonal to the rectification of justified grievances, the case for which is implied directly by the concept of 'justified grievances' without any need to invoke the perilous consequences of the failure to do so'. 20 In a similar vein, Mary Kaldor's characterisation of post-cold war conflicts as 'new' wars, although not formally reliant on neo-classical economics, makes a comparable set of claims.
She argues that such conflicts emerge as a consequence of the forces of globalisation that 34 The persistent conflict framework, thus, sets out an imperative to produce strengthened liberal democratic states by working in conjunction with local protagonists -'national reformers' -deemed capable and willing to engage in liberal peace building, whilst marginalising those whose interests and identities are deemed wedded to the reproduction of violence -these are to be contained, or 'overcome', with 'strong policing and military capacities.' As this article will show, it is precisely this framework that underpinned multifaceted international efforts to produce liberal peace in However, the ambition to end terrorism and pursue liberal peace in disparate conflict countries through measures to produce both security and development was impelled by a new urgency after 9/11. With war-torn or otherwise 'fragile' or 'collapsing' states deemed potential incubators and havens for terrorism, ending armed conflict, producing security (i.e.
ending and foreclosing violence) and ensuing development became a priority not only for stability in the South, but security at home in the West. 36 While the adoption of the liberal peace discourse in the expansion of the WoT to target Iraq and other claimed 'rogue' state sponsors of terrorism has caused some advocates of liberal peace to recoil, the foundational assumptions of the WoT and persistent conflict thesis -and that such conflicts held the potential of state collapse and possibly conditions for (local and global) terrorism -have largely remained uncontested. Indeed, over a decade after the WoT began, the convergence of 'security' and 'development' has become highly institutionalised; the US military, for example, is now increasingly the lead actor directing America's humanitarian and development (anti-terrorism) efforts in Africa, while the European Union's new external affairs service is explicitly seeking to further integrate the bloc's massive aid program into its joint security and foreign policy strategies, in which a foremost concern is to confront 'all violence, all terror, and all fanaticism' and thereby 'change the course of world affairs'. 37 In short, after 9/11, international efforts to eradicate terrorism and those to expand liberal peace (i.e. liberal peacebuilding) became integral to each other.
Politics and conflict in Sri Lanka and Nepal
International In pointing to these continuities, we are not suggesting that all acts of violence were purely motivated and controlled by political ideology. Long-run conflicts invariably bring together actors with a diversity of motivations and there are often important disjunctions between local and elite-level drivers of violence. 41 However, the argument here shows that the organised violence of the Sri Lankan and Nepali armed conflicts was clearly linked to competing, long-standing, political projects and the outcomes cannot be explained except through these linkages -which may indeed have been mediated at the micro level through complex and fluctuating motivations, interests and political economies.
There are of course significant differences between the two cases. In Nepal, the protagonists broadly shared a national framework, whereas Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict has been driven by two divergent framings of national identity; one of Sinhala Buddhist dominance and the other Buddhist nationalisms must be viewed as historically evolved and deep seated political projects that required amongst other things the political accommodation of intra-Sinhala and intra-Tamil ethnic differences. 43 Notwithstanding the apparent greater importance of ethnicity in Sri Lanka's conflict, it is these linkages between politics and violence demonstrated in the political continuities of the pre-war, war and post-war eras that make these apparently dissimilar cases comparable sites of international liberal peace intervention. The following sections will therefore discuss in turn the dynamics of conflict and international engagement in Sri Lanka and Nepal before the paper comes to a conclusion that briefly discusses the implications of the arguments presented here for ongoing international efforts to produce liberal peace in sites of conflict.
Sri Lanka:
International support for the Sri Lankan state as an agent willing and capable of liberal reform and the consequent effort to contain and marginalise the LTTE as the sole obstacle to the production of liberal order was apparent from the mid-1990s and continued until just before the end of the war (the reasons for the change are discussed below). 
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The international community -with India, the US and EU countries at the forefront -started to strongly support the state in the conflict -in primis the Monarchy -in order to end the insurgency by military defeat of the Maoists regarding them as antithetical to the normative and institutional objectives of liberal peacebuilding. 74 In fact, already during the peacetalks, the Indian and US Governments used anti-terrorism legislation to proscribe the Maoists, In the meantime, the US continued to urge the King to reach out to the political parties, while counselling the parties against collaborating with the Maoists. 83 As late as 2005, US officials characterised the Maoist agenda in unequivocal terms as that of a 'one party totalitarian state'. 84 Significantly, US-led efforts to marginalise the Maoists were undermined by Gyanendra's own unwillingness to compromise with the parties. While some international actors were more willing to make this tactical change than others, the strategic objective was shared by the international community and there was a clear directionality to the movement.
As a result, the US got on board of the new international approach to Nepal's conflict. 6 For a discussion of the problems and tensions within and between the various strategic complexes of the liberal peace building project see Newman et al Liberal Peacebuilding. 7 The scholarly literature on the causes of armed conflict is of course much broader than the characterisation that we present here. See for example work by Cramer, Kalyvas and also Keen cited in the bibliography. However, our focus is on the characterisation of armed conflict within liberal peace policy and practice and we would argue that liberal peace frameworks continue to treat the drivers of conflict in primarily terms of rational choice and or economic self interest. See for example our discussion of the World Development Report, 2011 below and also a critique of the same by Jones & Rogers The World Bank's World Development Report. We note that Collier et all have switched from the earlier 'greed vs grievance' to 'feasibility'. However, as our discussion shows, the notion that armed conflict will occur where it is 'feasible' does not fundamentally alter the economist framing of conflict dynamics, particularly the understanding of armed non-state actors, or indeed the injunction to secure and strengthen the state. 9 Kaldor New and old wars.
10 Arguably these armed conflicts could end decisively precisely because the respective protagonists in Nepal and Sri Lanka sought concrete political objectives through organised violence. In Nepal the Maoists could abandon the armed struggle because the constitutional path to state restructuring became -and continues to beplausible whilst the Sri Lankan military relentlessly pursued the military destruction of the LTTE and a final end to armed conflict because it ultimately sought -and is pursuing -militarised Sinhala dominance in the Tamil speaking areas, formerly under LTTE control. 38 Drawing on the liberal peace literature (see note 7 above) we argue that the liberal peace framework cannot be understood as in any way epiphenomenal to other and more 'realist' conceptions of security and geo-political interest. We adopt the view that conceptions of security and geo-political interest are rarely objectively present, but must instead by discursively constructed; see for example Campbell Writing Security and Laffey & Weldes eds Cultures of Insecurity. Our argument is that in Sri Lanka and Nepal, as in numerous other conflict zones, security and geo-political interest were framed in liberal peace terms. International actors supported Sri Lankan and Nepali state elites in so far as these elites were thought to be capable and / or willing to engage in liberal reform, and thereby partners in the pursuit of (liberal peace) security. When these perceptions changed, they opposed their previous allies as obstacles to the pursuit of the same objectives of stability and security, framed in liberal peace terms. 39 The 'strategic complexes' of liberal peace engagement in both Sri Lanka and Nepal consist of a wide array of actors who were rarely in perfect alignment. There were often tactical differences between them (see for example note 47) below. At the same time there was also a high degree of co-ordination between key actors. For example US, EU, Japan and Norway were jointly the four 'co-chairs' of the Norwegian mediated peace process in Sri Lanka (2001-6). Similarly in Nepal, in 2001 the Monarchy received military support from India and the US. Subsequently all major actors supported the constitutional reform process that excluded the Monarchy but included the Maoists. However, as we note later on p24 there were differences between the actors and some were more willing to make this switch than others. 46 Within a year, the navy and air force doubled in size and were reequipped with more powerful weaponry. The army reorganised and expanded, doubling its complement of artillery and tanks. As US Ambassador Jeffrey Lunstead, put it, 'as part of its strategy of promoting the peace process, the US began to strengthen its military relationship with the government.' From Lunstead, The United States' Role, 17.
47 See reports in Tamil Net 'GOSL -LTTE sign PTOMS' and 'Tigers release proposal for Interim Self Governing Authority' 48 Rajapakse often presents himself as the true heir of the '1956 Revolution' -a reference to the elections that brought the first explicitly Sinhala Buddhist SLFP led government to power. See Gunasekara 'The Rajapakse Presidency'. 49 It is important to note that a number of EU states were at first reluctant to proscribe the LTTE, on the basis that it would undermine the peace-process. However, they were subsequently persuaded by the UK and US. Nevertheless what is important for the purposes of this paper is the fact that the LTTE's demand for territorial autonomy had deep continuities in the pre-LTTE and subsequently post-LTTE eras of Tamil politics. In the present post-LTTE politics, the protagonists for leadership both on the island and in the significant west-based Diaspora are nevertheless agreed on the principle of securing Tamil political autonomy from the Sinhala Buddhist state. In this sense the demand for autonomy is the 'banal' background of all political contestation in the Tamil space. For a discussion of nationalism as the necessary but 'banal' background of all political contestation see Billig Banal Nationalism. It has been argued that the government's unequivocal rejection of liberal peace demands and the increasing tension between Colombo and its former allies (western states and India) reflects the growing role of China on the island. There are a number of problems with this argument. China's interests on the island (as elsewhere) appear to be primarily commercial and whilst these are not in alignment with the liberal peace agenda, neither are they opposed. Notably during the conflict both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan military used Chinese manufactured weapons, the Chinese ambassador was also one of the first to formally visit the LTTE held areas after the February 2002 ceasefire. Furthermore recent Chinese funded infrastructure projects in the southern parts of the island, particularly the Hambantota harbour, cannot be considered a vehicle for creating strategic alliances that could be used to 'balance' opposing powers, as in the Cold War. To begin with these projects are funded by Chinese bank loans, agreed at near commercial rates, that the Sri Lankan government has to repay. Having obtained a Chinese built harbour in Hambantota, the Sri Lankan government is now struggling to make the port commercially viable. To this end it has recently issued new regulations forcing vehicle importers to move their business from Colombo to Hambantota. (See Lanka Business Online 'Diversion').
Finally it should be noted that there are also similar Chinese funded projects in Nepal, and yet these have not substantially altered the very different outcome of liberal peace building there. More importantly we would suggest that the focus on China ignores the long antecedents of the Sinhala Buddhist framework that preceded by several decades President Rajapakse's presidency and indeed China's recent and accelerated economic growth.
